NettetADVERSE SELECTION AND CREDIT CERTIFICATES: EVIDENCE FROM A P2P PLATFORM Maggie Rong Hu, Xiaoyang Li, and Yang Shi No. 942 April 2024. ... To reduce information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers, Chinese peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platforms encourage borrowers to obtain various kinds of Nettet1 Introduction 1 Formal-sector lenders in developing countries often impose very tight borrowing require- 2 ments, such as high deposit requirements or guarantor requirements. To the extent that these 3 requirements restrict credit access, investment, technology adoption, and welfare, there may be 4 a strong case for steps to encourage lenders to …
Fintech Lending: Financial Inclusion, Risk Pricing, and Alte
Nettet19. jun. 2013 · However, variable pricing can lead to adverse selection, and in this paper we extend the idea that in an auction model of a borrower applying for a credit card the 'winner's curse' can lead to adverse selection. The detailed model we develop shows the impact that adverse selection can have on the lender's expected and actual profit. … Nettet19. jun. 2024 · Mitigating adverse selection: Leveraging advanced pricing strategies. June 19, 2024 by Ian Lampl, LoanStreet. ... Lenders, of course, want to maintain their best client relationships. filibuster current events
Credit card pricing and impact of adverse selection - JSTOR
Nettet11. jan. 2024 · Abstract: This paper explores the significance of unobservable default risk in mortgage and automobile loan markets. I develop and estimate a two-period model that allows for heterogeneous forms of simultaneous adverse selection and moral hazard. Controlling for income levels, loan size and risk aversion, I find robust evidence of … Nettet4. sep. 2012 · We study the online market for peer-to-peer (P2P) lending, in which individuals bid on unsecured microloans sought by other individual borrowers. Using a … NettetThis paper provides evidence of adverse selection in the choice of loan maturity among prime, unsecured consumer credit borrowers in the US. We exploit a natural experiment generated by a change in the menu of loan contracts offered to borrowers of an online lending platform, Lending Club (hereafter LC). The setting approximates filibuster created